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not	 differentiate	 between	 identity	 categories,	 the	 ‘stirring	 up’	 offences	 of	 the	 United	
Kingdom	Public	Order	Act	1986	 are	 stratified	 along	grounds	 of	 race,	 religion	and	 sexual	
orientation.	This	article	argues	that,	while	the	concerns	raised	about	identity	categories	in	
relation	 to	 hate	 crime	 legislation	 are	 equally	 relevant	 to	 the	 stirring	 up	 provisions,	 the	
proposed	 solutions	 cannot	 automatically	 be	 transposed	 to	 hate	 speech	 offences.	
Accordingly,	this	article	explores	challenges	that	are	encountered	in	attempts	to	make	hate	
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construction	 or	 enhancement	 of	 criminal	 offences	 penalising	 hatred,	 hostility	 or	 prejudice	 on	
grounds	 of	 a	 finite	 selection	 of	 discrete	 identity	 categories,	 such	 as	 race,	 religion,	 sexual	
orientation,	 disability	 or	 transgender	 identity.	 Both	 advocates	 and	 opponents	 of	 anti‐hate	
legislation	(for	example,	Schweppe	2012	and	Heinze	2009,	respectively)	have	argued	that	such	
an	 approach	 is	 too	 narrow	 to	 reflect	 the	wide	 variety	 of	 experiences	 of	 hatred,	 and	 that	 the	







are	present	 in	 two	Acts	 pertaining	 to	hate	 crime	and	one	which	 covers	 certain	 forms	of	 hate	
speech.	The	hate	crime	Acts	are	the	Crime	and	Justice	Disorder	Act	1998,	which	establishes	a	class	
of	‘aggravated	offences’	for	offences	motivated	by	or	demonstrating	racial	or	religious	hostility,	




of	 race,	 religion	 or	 sexual	 orientation.	 The	 inconsistency	 regarding	 the	 selection	 of	 identity	
categories	protected	under	 these	 three	Acts	 is,	 therefore,	plain	 to	see.	However,	 the	extent	 to	
































categories.	 By	naming	 certain	 grounds	upon	which	 the	propagation	 of	 hatred	 is	 criminal,	 the	















because	 of	 their	 status.	 In	 other	 words,	 hate	 crime	 laws	 punish	 attacks	 on	
everyone.	(Bell	2002:	181)	
	
Therefore,	 lists	 of	 protected	 categories	 do	 not	 formally	 compromise	 principles	 of	 equality.	















and	 ambiguity’	 (Moran	 and	 Sharpe	 2004:	 408;	 see	 also	Berlant	 1997:	 19;	Moran	 2014:	 268).	
Scholars	have	critiqued	simplistic	approaches	that	treat	identity	categories	as	‘either/or’,	or	as	
simply	 the	 sum	 of	 separable	 and	 pre‐determined	 categories	 (Grabham	 2009;	 Lamble	 2008;	
Moran	and	Sharpe	2004;	Mason	2005).	While	different	identity	categories	clumsily	encapsulate	
different	experiences,	they	also	fail	to	account	for	the	ways	in	which	particular	combinations	of	
perceived	 identities	 may	 evoke	 particular	 prejudices	 and	 hostilities	 (Garland	 and	 Hodkinson	
2014;	Walters	and	Brown	2016).	Therefore,	it	should	not	automatically	be	assumed	that	different	
identities	require	the	same	protections	from	the	law;	greater	nuance	is	required	to	remedy	the	























of	 social	 cohesion	and	can,	 instead,	be	an	essential	 step	 towards	genuine	 inclusivity.	 If	 a	hate	
crime	is	a	 ‘message	crime’	(Perry	2001:	10;	see	also	Rosga	2001)	(and	hate	speech	even	more	
overtly	so),	the	message	surely	requires	a	response.	‘Strategic	essentialism’	(Law	1996:	5)	should	







production	 of	 subjects	 through	 identity	 categories	 and	 the	 implications	 that	 this	 has	 for	
individuals.	 Identity	 politics	 have	 been	 criticised	 for	 reinforcing	 problematic	 distinctions	 that	
classify	 everyone	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 singular	 biased	 standard	 (white,	 able‐bodied,	 heterosexual,	
cisgender,2	male,	citizen,	and	so	on)	(Brown	1995:	61).	Non‐standard	groups	are	therefore	at	risk	






























































grounds	 deserve	 commensurate	 protection.	 However,	 where	 the	 categories	 that	 are	 listed	
include,	for	example,	race,	religion	and	sexual	orientation	discerning	the	commonalities	between	
them	according	to	which	other	categories	might	be	deemed	similar	can	be	difficult.	Even	if	race	
and	 sexual	 orientation	 are	 deemed	 immutable,	 religion	 is	 more	 widely	 perceived	 as	 a	





Attempting	 to	 find	 a	 common	 essence	 within	 any	 given	 set	 of	 stipulated	 categories	 may	 be	
fallacious.	Instead,	an	‘other’	category	might	only	need	to	be	deemed	similar	to	only	one	listed	














other,	 while	 simultaneously	 being	 inclusive	 and	 nondiscriminatory’	 (Schweppe	 2012:	 191).	
Indeed,	Schweppe	expressly	rejects	consideration	of	the	extent	to	which	the	category	in	question	
is	 commensurate	 with	 a	 listed	 category	 (2012:	 190).	 Similarity	 is,	 therefore,	 granted	 a	 wide	
interpretation	 but	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 clear	 what	 constitutes	 a	 community.	 It	 is	 relatively	
common	these	days	for	a	gay,	LGBT	(lesbian,	gay,	bisexual	and	transgender)	or	queer	community	
to	 be	 spoken	 of,	 but	 can	 persons	with	 disabilities	 be	 said	 to	 form	 a	 community?	What	 if	 we	
consider	gender	as	a	ground	that	motivates	acts	of	hatred	(Mason‐Bish	2014)?	Can	women	be	
said	to	comprise	a	community?	And	what	then	about	the	‘heterosexual	community’	or	the	‘male	
community’?	 Can	 such	 communities	 be	 said	 to	 exist	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way?	 The	 focus	 on	
communities	seems	to	engender	a	shift	from	categories	to	groups.	Thus,	instead	of	a	hate	crime	






Additionally,	 issues	 relating	 to	 intersectionality	 and	 essentialism	 are	 not	 resolved	 by	 the	





















crimes,	 Chakraborti	 and	 Garland	 call	 for	 legislation	 against	 a	 broader	 concept	 of	 bias	 crimes	
which	 encompasses	 all	 situations	 where	 the	 victim	 is	 targeted	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 perceived	
vulnerability	or	‘difference’.	This	builds	upon	Perry’s	(2001)	definition	of	hate	crime	as	a	process	
of	 inscribing	 difference	 and	 asserting	 the	 structural	 inferiority	 of	 a	 group.	 Chakraborti	 and	
Garland	argue	that	such	a	definition	fails	to	account	for	instances	of	targeted	violence	that	are	
more	 opportunist	 and/or	more	 individualised,	 as	well	 as	 instances	where	 ‘traditional’	 power	
dynamics	 are	 inverted	 and	 persons	 are	 targeted	 for	 their	membership	 of	 a	 supposedly	more	
dominant	 social	 group	 (2012:	 504‐505).	 Thus,	 ‘[c]onceiving	 of	 these	 offences	 purely	 as	 a	
mechanism	of	oppression	or	subordination	overplays	what	for	some	perpetrators	will	be	an	act	













or	 assessing	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 victim	 complies	 with	 pre‐determined	 ideas	 about	 what	
femaleness	is	or	should	be	(Stanko	2001:	318).	Another	advantage	of	the	vulnerability	approach	


















upon	 the	 victim	 rather	 than	 a	 response	 to	 already‐existing	 vulnerability.	 Rather	 than	



















































with	hatred	against	groups.	To	be	 intelligible	to	the	 law,	 these	projected	victim	categories	are	
necessarily	essentialised	preconceptions	of	the	sorts	of	people	whom	the	law	wants	to	protect.	
Indeed,	in	light	of	Zedner’s	(2007)	analysis	of	the	legal	shift	from	backward‐looking	reactions	to	







prosecuted	 as	 aggravated	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 race,	 religion	 or	 sexual	 orientation;	 however,	
threatening	or	abusive	language	that	is	used	to	cause	harassment,	alarm	or	distress	is	an	offence	
under	Section	5	regardless	of	whether	it	is	also	classified	as,	for	example,	racist.	Conversely,	the	




In	 the	 search	 for	 alternatives	 to	 rigid	 identity	 categories,	 the	 stirring	 up	 provisions	 present	
different	challenges	to	those	discussed	above	in	relation	to	hate	crime	laws.	Firstly,	hate	speech	
legislation	 is	 not	 constrained	 by	 the	 need	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ‘ordinary’	 crimes	 and	 hate	
crimes.	Whereas	hate	crime	provisions	enhance	the	penalties	that	are	applied	to	particular	pre‐
existing	offences,	Parts	III	and	IIIA	of	the	POA	create	new	offences	that	would	not	otherwise	be	








a	 community	or	 to	 inter‐community	 relations.	 Such	harms	might	 include	 fear,	 discrimination,	











Furthermore,	 questions	 about	what	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 community	 and	 how	 to	 account	 for	
intersectionality	are	less	problematic	in	relation	to	hate	speech,	as	the	target	community	will	be	
interpellated	 by	 the	 speech	 in	 question.	 For	 example,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 hate	 speech	







hate	 speech	 against	 child	 sex	 offenders,	 a	 group	 demarcated	 by	 hate	 speech	 itself,	 would	 be	




based	approach,	 it	 is	 far	more	problematic	 for	Chakraborti	and	Garland’s	(2012)	vulnerability	
approach.	This	is	because	the	vulnerability	approach	unavoidably	relies	upon	the	presence	of	a	





One	 challenge	with	 hate	 crime	 law	 is	 that	 applying	 penalty‐enhancing	 provisions	 too	 widely	
undermines	the	message	that	such	laws	communicate	about	the	depravity	of	certain	motivations	

















well‐defined	existing	ones.	This	perhaps	echoes	 the	concept	of	 ‘othering’	 that	 is	developed	by	
Perry	and	the	significance	that	Chakraborti	and	Garland	place	on	notions	of	‘difference’;	fear	of	
difference	and	the	impulse	to	assert	superiority	over	it	may	be	just	as	harmful	when	it	is	a	newly	


















A	 further	 argument	 is	 that,	 to	 be	more	 inclusive,	more	 speech	would	 need	 to	 fall	 within	 the	
purview	of	the	law.	Any	expansion	of	the	current	provisions	may,	therefore,	be	resisted	on	the	






However,	greater	 inclusivity	within	 the	stirring	up	provisions	need	not	necessarily	 result	 in	a	
broad	infringement	on	freedom	of	speech	for	three	reasons.	Firstly,	if	freedom	of	speech	does	not	
grant	a	license	to	stir	up	hatred	on	the	grounds	of	race,	religion	or	sexual	orientation,	suggesting	








of	 prosecutions.	 Indeed,	 the	 infrequency	with	which	 they	 are	 invoked	 has	 been	 levelled	 as	 a	
criticism	 against	 them	 and	 as	 an	 argument	 for	 the	 futility	 of	 extending	 them	 to	 cover	 other	
categories	(UK	Law	Commission	2014).	While	such	an	argument	seems	to	overlook	the	extent	to	
which	such	provisions	may	act	as	a	deterrent	and	to	 ignore	their	symbolic	value,	 the	fear	of	a	





















within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 law	 would	 still	 not	 be	 acceptable.	 In	 particular,	 the	 expression	 and	
incitement	 of	 hatred	 towards	 political	 groups	 must	 be	 permissible	 within	 a	 functioning	
democracy.	This	does	not	 include	personal	 threats,	harassment	or	other	 criminal	acts	but	 the	
expression	of	disgust,	hostility,	derision	and	perceptions	of	inferiority	towards	people	because	of	





















and	 permissible	 factors	might	 include	 a	 group’s	 subscription	 to	 certain	 political	 beliefs,	 their	
active	participation	in	a	particular	event	or	their	behaviour	that	in	some	significant	way	affects	
public	life.	Arbitrary	characteristics,	alternatively,	are	those	that	have	no	relevance	to	public	life	
and/or	 to	which	 sweeping	negative	 connotations	 can	only	be	ascribed	 through	prejudice	 and	






To	 take	 another	 example	 that	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 this	 article,	 a	 concept	 of	 arbitrary	
characteristics	 would	 not	 extend	 protection	 to	 child	 sex	 offenders.	 The	 stirring	 up	 of	 hatred	
against	child	sex	offenders	incites	hatred	against	a	group	of	people	because	of	illegal	actions	that	




The	 example	 of	 inciting	 hatred	 against	 feminists	 is	 more	 difficult.	 Such	 hatred	 is	 ostensibly	
targeted	towards	political	beliefs	rather	than	particular	types	of	people	but	it	can	also	be	seen	as	
an	 attempt	 to	 shut	 down	 certain	 voices	 and,	 thereby,	 to	 perpetuate	 historically	 entrenched	
oppression.	Therefore,	the	concept	of	arbitrary	characteristics	needs	to	consider	the	effects	of	the	
speech	as	well	as	its	content.	Expressing	hatred	towards	feminists	because	they	are	‘anti‐men’,	
because	 they	are	aggressive	or	because	 ‘it	 is	women	who	are	privileged	 in	 society’	 should	be	
allowed,	not	only	in	deference	to	the	freedom	of	speech	of	the	speaker	but	also	so	that	counter	













private	 characteristics.	 Thus,	 the	 sexual	 orientation	 of	 an	 individual	 might	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	
characteristic	(see	Berlant	1997)	that	should	have	no	bearing	on	public	life,	so	it	is	impermissible	
to	 incite	 hatred	 on	 such	 grounds.	 Voicing	 disapproval	 of	 homosexual	 activity	 would	 be	
permissible,	for	example,	but	not	inciting	hatred	against	consenting	adults	who	engage	in	such	
activity	in	private.	This	might	be	a	fine	line	to	draw	but	it	would	place	no	more	discretion	in	the	
hands	 of	 a	 court	 than	 the	 current	 legislation.	 The	 case	 of	 sex	 workers	 and	 addicts	 is	 less	
straightforward	as	there	is	perhaps	more	of	a	case	to	be	made	that	their	activities	impact	society	
and	public	life,	even	though	they	cannot	be	said	to	involve	public	activities	per	se.	Incitement	to	




Perhaps	 the	 exclusion	 of	 such	 groups	 is	 a	 flaw	 in	 the	 arbitrary	 characteristics	 approach;	 or	
perhaps	it	is	not,	due	to	the	rarity	of	incitement	to	hatred	on	these	grounds	and	the	need	for	open	

















finite	 lists	 of	 identity	 categories	 that	 fail	 to	 represent	 the	 lived	 realties	 of	 the	 law’s	 subjects.	
Examining	the	nuances	of	this	task	has	revealed	that	there	are	significant	differences	between	the	
challenges	that	arise	in	relation	to	hate	crime	and	those	that	emerge	in	relation	to	hate	speech.	
For	 hate	 crime	 laws,	 the	 primary	 challenge	 lies	 in	 the	 need	 to	 distinguish	 hate	 crimes	 from	
‘ordinary’	crimes	whereas,	for	hate	speech	laws,	the	difficulty	lies	in	the	distinction	between	hate	



















and	 defy	 the	 supposed	 slippery	 slope	 of	 censorship.	 Critics	 will	 no	 doubt	 find	 the	 notion	 of	
arbitrary	characteristics	too	vague	to	be	practicable,	a	criticism	that	is	levelled	at	one	or	another	
aspect	of	most	hate	speech	laws.	But	it	could	also	be	argued	that	such	vagueness	is	an	advantage:	
it	 allows	 for	 the	 specific	 circumstances	 of	 a	 case	 to	 be	meaningfully	 considered;	 it	 allows	 for	
unforeseen	forms	of	hatred	to	be	challenged;	and	it	allows	for	guidance	to	be	provided	through	
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